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ABSTRACT
The purpose of our research is to verify the impact of mandatory dividends on Brazilian publicly traded companies, focusing 
on both the value of cash holdings and the impact on corporate investment. Our work aims to reach the research objective 
making significant improvements over the previous works on the subject. First, we separate firms according to their dividend 
status. Second, in addition to investment regressions, we use the value of cash approach to test the impact of mandatory 
dividend on corporate financial decisions. Finally, our manual data collection makes it possible to allocate the dividend 
distributed to its reference period. Considering our context, where sources of financing are expensive and scarce, evidences 
obtained by the present research has great relevance. The law aims to protect the minority investor against the expropriation 
of resources. However, in dealing with all cases equally, legislation ends up harming companies that rely on these resources 
for their financing, thereby damaging their shareholders. This article brings new evidences, from an innovative approach, 
on factors affecting the availability of resources and its impact on the value of cash and on corporate investment in Brazil. 
We analyzed a sample of 1,654 dividend distributions from 2008 to 2015, using investment and firm value regressions. 
Our results indicate that companies paying just the minimum dividend have higher value attached to an extra unit of cash, 
corroborating our view that those companies will likely use these resources to fund future profitable investments. We also 
find that mandatory dividend has a negative impact on investment, but only for companies paying dividends above the 
minimum, contrary to our expectations. We argue that the marginal value of cash approach is a more effective way to test 
the impact of regulation on corporate financial decisions and this last evidence may be the result of endogeneity problems 
in investment regressions.
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1. INTRODUCTION
According to Vancin and Procianoy (2016), Brazilian 
reality regarding low availability of long-term resources to 
finance investment activities is a great incentive for high 
retention of cash by companies. Therefore, in general, 
internal financing has great importance for national 
company’s investment policy.
Specifically in Brazil, one legal feature can impact 
directly on the availability of firm’s internal funds: the 
mandatory dividend. In Brazil, firms are obligated by 
law to distribute a minimum share of their profits. The 
purpose of establishing a minimum mandatory dividend 
seems to be the protection of minority shareholders, by 
preventing the controller from retaining all profits, and 
thus to promote the development of the capital market 
(Coelho, 2002; La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, Shleifer, & 
Vishny, 1998, 2000; Souza, Peixoto, & Santos, 2016).
However, mandatory dividend rules remove part of 
the management discretion over the use of its internal 
resources. This means a reduction in cash flow available 
to companies, which could be used, among other things, 
for investments in profitable projects (Martins & Novaes, 
2012). In addition, firms whose dividend constraint is 
binding are likely financial constrained. According to 
Faulkender and Wang (2006), these firms are more prone 
to use their cash reserves to avoid the higher costs or 
raising money from external capital markets. Therefore, 
investors may place a higher value on cash reserves of 
such firms.
Thus, compulsory distribution of company’s profits 
may have impact on company’s investments and/or on 
how investors value firm’s cash reserves. The purpose of 
our research is precisely to verify the impact of mandatory 
dividends on Brazilian publicly traded companies’ internal 
funding, focusing on both the value of cash holdings and 
the impact on corporate investment.
In order to achieve this goal, we star our research 
from the premise that there is a basic difference between 
companies paying the minimum mandatory dividend and 
those paying above this amount. According to Vancin 
and Procianoy (2016), the formers are compelled by law 
to make some payment of dividends. If they could pay 
less than this obligatory amount, they would probably 
do so. The desire to pay is only found in those who pay 
above this minimum.
One reason why companies pay only the mandatory 
minimum may be financial constraints: with limited 
internal resources and costly external finance, firms cut 
profitable investments and set dividends to the minimum 
allowed in order to satisfy their budget constraints. In 
anticipation of future financial constraints, firms may also 
save cash today in order to be able to invest more in the 
future (Acharya, Almeida, & Campello, 2007; Almeida, 
Campello, & Weisbach, 2004). In these situations, 
corporate investment may be sensible to internal funds 
and the amount of mandatory dividends. In addition, 
cash holdings of firms facing financial constraints should 
have a higher value, since their likely use is to fund future 
value-enhancing investments (Faulkender & Wang, 2006).
On the other hand, there are companies that, by their 
own criteria, decide to distribute dividends above the 
mandatory minimum. If we admit that the dividend 
above minimum (discretionary) is residual, that is, would 
be the amount left over after all acceptable investment 
opportunities have been taken, the mandatory dividend 
of companies paying above minimum should not have 
an impact on their investments, after controlling for its 
other determinants. At the same time, cash holdings of 
those firms should have a lower value, since their likely 
use is to increase distributions to equity or pay down debt 
(Faulkender & Wang, 2006).
In summary, our main assumption is that companies 
plan the discretionary distribution based on their capital 
budgets. Consequently, for companies that pay just the 
minimum dividend, financial constraints are likely to be 
binding. For those firms we expect that: (i) cash holdings 
have a higher value at the eyes of investors (relatively 
to firms that pay dividends above minimum); and (ii) 
investments are negatively affected by the amount of 
mandatory dividends.
Using a sample of Brazilian publicly traded firms and 
hand collected data about the dividends decisions and 
policies of each firm, we estimate investment and firm 
value regressions like Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen 
(1988) and Faulkender and Wang (2006), respectively, 
augment by terms related to the mandatory dividend 
and the decision to pay just the minimum. Our evidences 
clearly suggest that companies paying just the minimum 
dividend have higher value attached to an extra unit of 
cash. This fact probably denotes a greater dependence on 
internal sources for investment and financing in these 
companies. Contrary to our expectations, our results 
also indicate that mandatory dividend has a negative 
impact on corporate investment, but only for firms that 
pay dividends above the mandatory.
Previously, Martins and Novaes (2012) tested the 
impact of dividends on investment of Brazilian publicly 
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traded companies. These authors concluded that the 
mandatory dividend law is effective, as the dividend yield 
in Brazil is superior to the one verified in the United 
States of America, without making the investment of 
Brazilian firms more difficult. This research pioneered the 
investigation of the topic and helped to begin elucidating 
the problem.
Our work aims to reach the research objective making 
significant improvements over the previous works on 
the subject. First, different from Martins and Novaes 
(2012), we separate firms (in each year) according to 
their dividend status: those paying just the mandatory 
minimum and those paying above the minimum. As 
we argued above, only the investments of the first group 
should be affected by the mandatory dividend. Since 
dividends above the mandatory minimum are prevalent 
in our sample of publicly traded firms, is not a surprise 
that Martins and Novaes (2012) did not find a significant 
effect of dividends on corporate investments.
Second, our manual data collection (which will be 
described later in section 3) makes it possible, with 
unprecedented accuracy, to allocate the dividend 
distributed to its reference period, that is, the fiscal year 
in which this profit was generated, and not to its payment 
period. As a direct consequence, empirical models will be 
more accurate to test the impact of mandatory dividend 
on corporate investment.
Finally, we obtain evidences on the effects of mandatory 
dividend rules on corporate decisions looking at the value 
shareholders place on companies’ cash. According to 
Faulkender and Wang (2006), the marginal value of cash 
(MVC) should depend on its most likely use. We claim 
that the most likely use can be inferred from the firm 
dividend decision to pay just the mandatory minimum 
or pay above it. A constrained firm that pays just the 
mandatory minimum will likely spend cash in value-
enhancing investment, while an unconstrained firm that 
pays above the mandatory minimum will likely use cash to 
pay down debt or increase distributions to shareholders. 
Since investment and dividend decisions are made by the 
same persons (directors and board of managers), one can 
argue that dividends, even though determined in part by 
law, are not exogenous in a firm investment regression. 
This same criticism loses much of its strength when we 
look at the MVC, because of value is set by capital market 
participants and not by the persons who determine the 
amount of dividends of the firm. We believe that this 
approach is a more effective way to evaluate the impact 
of regulation on corporate decisions.
The next section presents the hypotheses, the empirical 
models, and methods of estimation. Section 3 describes 
data collection and our sample. The results of this study 
are reported and discussed in section 4. The final section 
synthesizes the conclusions of the study.
2. RESEARCH DESIGN
In a perfect world, investment should depend only 
on firm’s investment opportunities. In the real world, 
characterized by several imperfections, like asymmetric 
information, transaction costs, taxes, etc., investment 
may be sensible to the availability of internal funds 
(Fazzari et al., 1988). Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995) 
point that several studies emphasize that investment is 
highly correlated with cash flow or other measures of 
internal funds. According to these authors, this correlation 
appears in models that contemplate imperfections in 
the capital market, either because of the investment is 
directly linked to the internal funds available in the case 
of credit rationing, or because of shocks in current profit 
affect the equity future liquidity and, therefore, terms of 
credit available to companies.
In this context, companies have two basic alternatives 
for allocating the results of their activities: to distribute 
the surplus profits to their shareholders or to invest them 
in profitable projects that will result in more profits 
for shareholders (at least in expectation). In this issue 
lies an important financial decision of the managers: 
pay dividends and thus reward shareholders for their 
capital invested or not distribute and thus demonstrate 
confidence in their investment opportunities that could 
be lost if dividends were paid. In a context where there 
is no obligation to distribute dividends, whether for legal 
or contractual reasons, if the company wishes, cash flow 
can be used in full in new investments.
Specifically in Brazil, the legislation imposes a minimum 
compulsory distribution of dividends, that is, Brazilian 
companies are compelled by law to distribute part of 
their internal resources. In addition, this obligation does 
not consider different realities faced by companies. Does 
not consider, for example, whether this share of internal 
resources would affect corporate investment, or if companies 
have other forms of financing, among other possibilites. The 
law affects all firms equally, despite the different financial 
realities experienced by each of the Brazilian companies.
Faulkender and Wang (2006) argue and provide 
evidences that the MVC to shareholders depends on the 
Daniel Francisco Vancin & Guilherme Kirch
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likely use of this cash. According to these authors (p. 
1958): “for firms that face greater financing constraints, 
especially those with valuable investment opportunities, 
the MVC should be higher than for firms that can easily 
raise additional capital”. Firms facing financing constraints 
are more likely to use an additional dollar of internal 
funds in value-enhancing investment opportunities and 
thus shareholders will place a higher value on their cash 
reserves.
We argue that companies that have paid dividends 
above minimum are non-financially constrained, since 
they choose to use a portion of free cash flow for earnings 
distribution. These companies indicate to the market that 
they have more than enough resources to make their viable 
investment projects, as they demonstrate that they have 
“idle” resources for extra distribution to their shareholders. 
However, companies that pay only the mandatory dividend 
can be considered financially constrained, since they only 
distribute the minimum necessary to comply with the 
legislation, i.e., they demonstrate that they need all the 
free cash flow for the company’s activities.
If a binding dividend constraint really results from 
financial constraints, we should expect that shareholders 
will place a higher value on cash reserves of firms that 
pay just the minimum mandatory dividend than on 
cash reserves of firms that pay above this amount. This 
reasoning leads to our first hypothesis:
H1: all else constant, the MVC decreases with the payment of 
dividends above the mandatory minimum.
To test this hypothesis, we take the model of Faulkender 
and Wang (2006) as reference. These authors, based on 
the studies of Fama and French (1998) and Pinkowitz 
and Williamson (2004), developed an empirical model to 
measure the marginal value that market investors place 
on the company’s cash. As we aim to measure how this 
MVC varies with dividend status, we augment the main 
empirical model estimated by Faulkender and Wang 
(2006) by including interactions between changes in 
cash and discretionary dividends (dividends above the 
mandatory minimum). Thus, we estimate the following 
model with firm and year fixed effects:
where ri,t is the stock return for firm i during fiscal year 
t, Ri,t is the stock i’s benchmark return at year t, Mi,t−1 is 
the one-year lagged (t-1) market value of equity, ∆Ci,t 
measures the change in cash holdings for firm i during 
fiscal year t, ∆Ei,t is the change in the firm’s profitability 
(earnings before interest and extraordinary items), 
∆NAi,t is the change in total assets net of cash, ∆RDi,t 
is the change in research and development (R&D), ∆Ii,t 
measures changes in interest expenses, ∆Di,t is the change 
in total dividends, Ci,t−1 is the cash holdings for firm i 
during fiscal year t-1, Li,t measures leverage at the end 
of fiscal year t, the ratio of the total liabilities and assets 
of a company, NFi,t is the firm’s net financing during the 
fiscal year t measured by the total issued shares plus total 
issued debt less repurchases and total debt redemption, 
and DivDi,t measures the amount of the discretionary 
dividend relative to the mandatory dividend.
We also use a discretized version of our discretionary 
dividend variable that we dubbed Dummyi,t. This variable 
takes value 1 if discretionary dividend is positive, and 
0 otherwise. Our argument is that firm that pay above 
the minimum are not financially constrained, will likely 
use cash to increase distributions to equity or pay down 
debt, and so investor will place a lower value on their 
cash holdings (Faulkender & Wang, 2006). Note that 
our argument is based only in the distinction between 
those firms paying above and those paying just the 
minimum mandatory dividend. This is the role played 
by our Dummyi,t variable. Moving a step forward, we also 
examine whether the intensity with which the firm pays 
dividends above the mandatory minimum affects its MVC. 
For this purpose we use the continuous variable DivDi,t.
The dependent variable is the percentage return of firm 
i stock subtracted from the return of the main reference 
index from the Brazilian stock exchange (Brasil Bolsa 
Balcão – B3): Índice Bovespa (Ibovespa). Faulkender and 
Wang (2006) use the 25 Fama and French portfolios 
formed on size and book-to-market as their benchmarks. 
Thus, for stock i, the benchmark return, in their case, is 
the return of the portfolio to which stock i belongs. The 
benchmark return should represent the expected return 
of stock i and so the dependent variable is the excess stock 
return. We opt for Ibovespa as the benchmark because it 
is the most important index of the Brazilian stock market, 
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and broad market portfolios are the most relevant factors 
in explaining individual and portfolio stock returns in this 
context [see, for example, Machado and Medeiros (2011) 
and Noda, Martelanc, and Securato (2014)].
The selected explanatory variables are controls of value 
sources besides money, but which are correlated with 
company’s retention of cash, according to Faulkender and 
Wang (2006). The use of variations (∆) in control variables 
serves to indicate unexpected changes in a variable that 
correlates with retention of money in companies.
As mentioned above, we use interaction terms in 
the model to test our first hypothesis. We use the term 
α12 (∆Ci,t x DivDi,t) to estimate the effect of the payment 
of extra dividends on the value of firm cash. According to 
our hypothesis, α12 is expected to be negative, indicating 
that the MVC reserves decreases as the company decides 
to distribute more discretionary dividends.
After the estimation of the proposed model, we are 
able to measure the sensitivity of additional value (AV), 
that is, returns in excess to the market benchmark to 
variations on cash holdings. This step has the purpose of 
directly measure the AV linked to the variation in cash, 
i.e., how much value is assigned by the financial market to 
an additional cash unit (∆C). The calculation is performed 
through the first derivative of AV with respect to ∆C and 
is demonstrated in equation 2. 
The minimum dividend constraint imposed by law 
may be binding for some firms, due to their financial 
realities and investment opportunities, and thus we can 
expect that their investment and financial decisions may 
change relative to what would be in the absence of such 
constraint. Vancin and Procianoy (2016) state that there 
is a basic difference between the companies that pay the 
minimum mandatory dividend and those that pay above 
this amount. It is observed that the former are compelled 
by law to make some payment of dividends. If they could 
pay less than these obligatory, they would probably do so. 
The desire to pay is only found in those who pay above 
these minimums.
If a binding dividend constraint is the outcome 
of financial restrictions, we should expect a negative 
and significant effect of mandatory dividend on 
investment for those firms that pay just this amount. 
In this situation, mandatory dividends may force firms 
to cut investments. For companies that pay above the 
minimum, the mandatory dividend should not have an 
impact on investment (just as the dividend above the 
mandatory – the discretionary part – should not have), 
since these firms are not financially constrained. In other 
words, all else equal, we expect that firms that pay just 
the mandatory dividend invest less than firms that pay 
dividends above the mandatory minimum, that is, whose 
dividend constraint is not binding. This reasoning leads 
to our second hypothesis:
H2: minimum mandatory dividend reduces the level of investment 
of restricted companies, that is, those that distribute only the 
mandatory dividend.
In order to verify this hypothesis empirically, the 
following multiple regression model is estimated:
where Invi,t is the dependent variable that represents the 
companies’ investment. It is measured by the ratio between 
firm’s capital expenditure in period t and total assets in 
period t-1. CFi,t is the cash flow generated by firm i over 
period t. This variable represents the resources generated 
internally, being measured by the ratio between earnings 
before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization 
(EBITDA) in period t and total assets in period t-1. 
Qi,t−1 represents investment opportunities of firm i at 
the beginning of period t, obtained by the ratio between 
market value and book value of assets, the first being the 
sum of total assets and market value of the shares minus 
the value of net worth. MDivi,t−1 is the mandatory dividend.
More specifically, MDivi,t−1 measures how much the 
mandatory dividend represents of the firm cash flow. 
It is calculated by the ratio between the amount of the 
mandatory dividend distributed by the company and its 
EBITDA. We chose to estimate this variable with lag for 
two main reasons: (i) to avoid correlation with cash flow 
variable and (ii) by reading the minutes of the companies’ 
ordinary general meeting (OGM). It was observed that, 
normally, the distributed dividend in t refers to the profit 
generated in t-1 by the companies. Finally, mini,t−1 is a 
dummy variable that indicates whether the mandatory 
dividend constraint is binding. It receives the value of 1 
if the company distributes only the mandatory dividend 
in the previous year, and 0 otherwise.
According to H2, α4 should be negative and statistically 
significant, indicating that the higher is the fraction of 
mandatory dividend relative to firm cash flow, the lower 
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is the investment of binding dividend constraint firms. As 
in previous studies, Tobin’s Q and cash flow should attract 
positive coefficients, since better investment opportunities 
and more internal resources foster corporate investment 
(Abel & Eberly, 2011; Fazzari & Petersen, 1993; Fazzari et 
al., 1988; Gilchrist & Himmelberg, 1995; Hubbard, 1997; 
Lewellen & Lewellen, 2016).
An important criticism in the literature on investment-
cash flow sensitivities is the bias due to measurement 
errors in the investment opportunity variable (Tobin’s Q). 
Critics argue that cash flows only captures the effects of 
the set of investment opportunities not perfectly measured 
by Tobin’s Q, and therefore contest that cash flows would 
influence the firms’ investment demand by a financial 
constraint motive (Fazzari, Hubbard, & Petersen, 2000; 
Gomes, 2001; Kaplan & Zingales, 1997, 2000). We believe 
that our proposal of including an interaction between 
mandatory dividend and binding dividend constraint 
can overcome this criticism, since this interaction should 
capture firms’ financial constraints and it is not related 
to investment opportunities not captured by Tobin’s Q 
and cash flows.
3. DATA COLLECTION AND SAMPLE
The sample is composed of Brazilian companies listed 
on B3 in the period from 2008 to 2015, with financial 
companies excluded from the sample. The data related 
to financial statements, market value, and stock returns 
of these companies was extracted from the database of 
Economatica®.
In order to test our hypothesis, we need to classify 
Brazilian publicly traded companies among companies that 
pay dividends above mandatory minimum and companies 
that only pay this amount. Legislation determines that 
company’s bylaws may establish the minimum portion 
of profit distributed via dividends. If company bylaws is 
silent about this matter, the mandatory dividend is the one 
established in the law: 50% of adjusted net profit. Given 
this legal provision, the analysis of bylaws of companies 
listed on B3 becomes necessary for the fulfillment of the 
objectives of this work.
Thus, by analyzing bylaws of Brazilian publicly traded 
companies, we collect which portion of the adjusted net 
profit should be earmarked for mandatory payment of 
dividends for each one of them. In order to verify whether 
it was being paid or not, we used the article 192 of Brazilian 
corporate law (Lei n. 6.404/1976), which determines that 
the OGM must approve the proposed allocation of net 
income for the year. Therefore, was imperative to us read 
the minutes of the OGMs that approved the allocation of 
dividends, in order to relate dividends paid to the fiscal 
year that gave rise to them.
A total of 2,768 minutes of companies listed on 
B3 in the period from 2008 to 2015 were analyzed. 
After reading the minutes, a comparison was made 
between how much was approved by the OGM and 
how much, according to the legislation and bylaws of 
each company, should be allocated to shareholders as 
mandatory dividend. By making such a comparison, 
we can determine which companies are paying just 
the required or above it. Of this 2,768 dividend 
distributions, 668 were excluded for being banks or 
financial institutions and 446 for not having full data, 
resulting in a final unbalanced panel sample of 1,654 
firm-year observations, from 293 firms.
One can argue that mandatory dividend is not entirely 
exogenous, since it can be changed by a change in firm 
bylaws. Therefore, we eliminate from the sample those 
companies that have a mandatory dividend lower than 
25% of adjusted net profit (minimum amount determined 
by law if the firm wants to offer a share of profits to their 
managers) in their bylaws. At the end of 2012, 82.1% 
of Brazilian publicly-traded companies used in their 
bylaws the proportion of 25% of adjusted net income as 
mandatory dividend (Vancin, 2013).
To better describe the sample, we created Figure 1 
in order to demonstrate the existing payout pattern in 
Brazilian companies. From its analysis, we can observe, in 
general terms, that the proportion of profits distributed to 
the shareholders of Brazilian publicly traded companies 
is stable. For all companies in the sample, it is observed 
that over the period selected for the sample the average 
payout varied very little – the same occurring for the 
specific group of companies that distributed dividends 
above the mandatory minimum. One of the possible 
explanations is the managers’ fear of cutting dividends 
(informational content) and thus would have incentives to 
keep these payments constant. In the group of companies 
that distribute only the minimum, this observed stability 
is even stronger.
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Figure 1 Temporal evolution of dividend payments in Brazil 
Note: The chart is divided into three groups: Whole sample reflects the data for all sample companies, Just the mandatory, those 
who distributed only the minimum mandatory dividend, and Above mandatory, those who distributed above the minimum.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
Finally, atypical observations (outliers) should receive 
attention when performing multiple regressions. These 
extreme data can significantly influence the estimation 
of the parameters of the models. To eliminate such 
influence, we winsorize our variables at the 5 and 95% 
percentiles.
4. MAIN EMPIRICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present our main results. We start 
by commenting the descriptive statistics of our variables 
and then we test our hypotheses based on the estimations 
of models 1 and 3.
4.1 The Impact of the Mandatory Dividend on 
MVC – H1
An econometric model was developed and estimated 
in order to test the impact of the mandatory dividend on 
the marginal value of the companies’ cash. The variables 
selected for this model are basically controls of value 
sources for the company and that are correlated with 
the retention of money, according to Faulkender and 
Wang (2006). As explained previously in the present 
research, the sample is composed of Brazilian publicly 
traded companies (except financial companies) in the 
period from 2008 to 2015. The descriptive statistics are 
summarized in the Table 1.
According to the data in this table, Brazilian companies 
had an average increase in the amount of cash (∆Ci,t 
positive) in this period. We infer a possible precaution of 
the management of Brazilian publicly-traded companies, 
since during the analyzed period the intention was 
to maintain larger amounts of resources within the 
companies. An explanation for this fact stems from the 
cycles of crisis and uncertainty that hovered over Brazil 
in the period.
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics of variables selected for H1 model 
Variable Obs. Average σ Min. Max.
AVi,t 1,654 0.052 0.537 -1.302 2.221
∆Ci,t 1,654 0.025 0.167 -0.38 0.906
∆Ei,t 1,654 0.031 0.268 -1.117 1.172
∆NAi,t 1,654 0.099 0.383 -0.982 2.153
∆RDi,t 1,654 0.000 0.001 -0.002 0.004
∆Ii,t 1,654 0.012 0.163 -1.368 0.803
∆Di,t 1,654 0.001 0.037 -0.17 0.138
Ci,t−1 1,654 0.317 0.47 0 2.985
Li,t 1,654 0.721 0.493 0.09 2.681
NFi,t 1,654 0.173 0.587 -1.982 3.263
Note: The variables are described in the text. The Variable column presents all the variables included in the model, except for 
the interaction variables. The Obs. and Average columns indicate the number of observations collected for each of the variables 
and its mean, respectively. Column σ shows the standard deviation for each of the variables. Finally, the Min. and Max. columns 
present the minimum and maximum (extreme) data of each of the variables collected for the study. The data refer to the 2008-
2015 period of Brazilian publicly companies traded on Brasil Bolsa Balcão (B3), with the exception of financial companies.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
The variable Ci,t−1 represents the lagged cash holding 
of the companies divided by their lagged market value. 
On average cash represents 31.7% of the total value of 
a company equity. This value indicates a high retention 
of money within the Brazilian companies, which may 
reflect the low amount of financing options available in 
the national financial market, in addition to the high 
cost of the existing ones. Consequently, keeping cash 
resources to finance its activities and financing may be 
of great value and relevance. The mean for the AV (AVi,t) 
– dependent variable of the H1 model – was positive and 
relevant: 5.2%. From this fact, it can be inferred that in 
the period from 2008 to 2015, on average, the companies 
listed on B3 appreciated more than 5% above the stock 
market index. This fact is a probable reflection of the 
existence of greater quantity (in number of cases) of 
positive extreme returns.
In addition, other interesting aspects can be listed 
from the analysis of the descriptive data of the complete 
sample. During the study period, there was an increase 
in the profitability (∆Ei,t) of Brazilian companies, as well 
as an increase in their net assets (∆NAi,t). Similarly, there 
was an increase in net financing (NFi,t) of companies, 
which probably helped in the increase in interest expenses 
(∆Ii,t). The typical (average) firm in our sample has a 
debt to (lag) equity ratio (Li,t) of 72.1% and changes its 
dividends (∆Di,t) by 0.1% of the lagged market value of 
equity each year. Finally, it is important to mention the 
extremely low R&D spending in Brazil.
Regarding the dependent variable AVi,t, we can see, in 
Figure 2, its temporal evolution. Because of the proposed 
econometric models have panel data, this analysis may 
yield interesting insights. For all companies, we can 
observe two years with negative average data (2008 and 
2014), two years with near zero data (2009 and 2015), 
and four more clearly positive years (2010 to 2013). As 
shown in Table 5, the mean value for the entire sample 
period was 5.2%. We can infer from this graph then 
that the average VA of the Brazilian listed companies 
selected in our sample has great variability. This pattern is 
observed both in the group of companies that distributed 
only the minimum mandatory dividend and those that 
distributed above it. Finally, firm-year observations that 
pay dividends above the minimum present higher (mean) 
excess returns than firm-year observations that pay just 
the minimum.
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Figure 2 Temporal evolution of the mean value of the variable AVi,t 
Note: The chart is divided into three groups: Average AV reflects the data for all sample companies, Average AV (MINIMUM), 
those who distributed only the minimum mandatory dividend, and Average AV (ABOVE), those who distributed above the 
minimum.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
In Table 2, the sample is divided among companies that 
distribute dividends above the mandatory minimum and 
those that do not. This segregation is intended to verify 
differences and similarities between these groups, that 
is, a preliminary indication of differences in the amount 
of cash available to these companies and other factors 
correlated to cash. To test if the differences between the 
two groups are statistically significant, a t test of means 
was performed.
According to the results of Table 2, companies that 
pay dividends above the mandatory minimum are 
characterized by a more pronounced increase in cash 
and net assets over the period studied than those that 
pay only the minimum or do not distribute dividends 
(those that just comply with the legislation). These facts 
indicates that the first group of companies invests more 
and has a greater need for liquidity or can accumulate cash 
more easily than the second group. In average, firms that 
pay dividends above the mandatory also increased the 
proportion of distributed profits (∆D) while companies 
that pay only the minimum or do not distribute at all 
decreased dividends along this time period. It is plausible 
that both facts are connected – the increase of money 
within the company may have caused (at least partially) 
the distribution of larger earnings.
This increase of money within the company and the 
increase of dividends in companies that pay above the 
minimum may have as source the more accentuated 
increase in their net external financing (NF). Additionally, 
these firms generate more profits (∆E) in relation to the 
other group. These differences between groups, however, 
are not statistically significant. In sum, companies that 
pay dividends above the minimum have increased the 
money within the company to a greater extent and 
thus distributed more dividends than the rest of the 
sample, while the source of these resources would be 
both external and internal. It is also observed that 
these companies had higher stock market valuation 
appreciation (model dependent variable – AV) than the 
rest of the companies in the sample. This fact is indicative 
of positive expectations of the financial market on the 
future of these companies.
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Table 2
Segmented descriptive statistics of the variables selected for the H1 model
Panel A: Companies that distribute dividends above the mandatory
Variable Obs. Average σ Min. Max. t test
AVi,t 484 0.150 0.489 -1.224 2.221 4.8***
∆Ci,t 484 0.05 0.191 -0.38 0.906 3.89***
∆Ei,t 484 0.035 0.235 -1.117 1.172 0.43
∆NAi,t 484 0.132 0.414 -0.982 2.153 2.28**
∆RDi,t 484 0.3 0.937 -1.64 4.28 6.79***
∆Ii,t 484 0.005 0.101 -0.703 0.592 -1.14
∆Di,t 484 0.004 0.05 -0.17 0.138 2.17**
Ci,t-1 484 0.411 0.501 0.000 2.985 5.31***
Li,t 484 0.517 0.18 0.09 0.885 -12.3***
NFi,t 484 0.178 0.546 -1.982 3.263 0.2
Panel B: Companies that do not pay dividends or pay only the minimum
AVi,t 1,170 0.016 0.55 -1.302 2.221 -4.8***
∆Ci,t 1,170 0.016 0.157 -0.380 0.906 -3.89***
∆Ei,t 1,170 0.029 0.28 -1.117 1.172 -0.43
∆NAi,t 1,170 0.086 0.37 -0.982 2.153 -2.28**
∆RDi,t 1,170 0.005 0.499 -1.64 4.28 -6.79***
∆Ii,t 1,170 0.015 0.18 -1.368 0.803 1.14
∆Di,t 1,170 -0.000 0.0317 -0.170 0.138 -2.17**
Ci,t-1 1,170 0.283 0.453 0 2.985 -5.31***
Li,t 1,170 0.794 0.546 0.09 2.681 12.3***
NFi,t 1,170 0.171 0.602 -1.982 3.263 -0.2
Note: The variables are described in the text. The Variable column presents all the variables included in the model, except for 
the interaction variables. The Obs. and Average columns indicate the number of observations collected for each of the variables 
and its mean, respectively. Column σ shows the standard deviation for each of the variables. Finally, the Min. and Max. columns 
present the minimum and maximum (extreme) data of each of the variables collected for the study. Descriptive statistics have 
been segmented into groups: in Panel A we present descriptive statistics of companies that pay dividends above the mandatory 
minimum and, in Panel B, of those companies that do not pay dividends or pay only the minimum. The t test column presents 
the t statistics of the difference in means test between these groups of companies. The data refer to the 2008-2015 period of 
Brazilian publicly traded companies from Brasil Bolsa Balcão (B3), with the exception of financial companies. The values of the 
variable ∆RD were multiplied by 1,000 for better visualization.
*** indicate p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, and * indicates p < 0.1.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
Based on these preliminary data, we now begin the 
analysis of the results of the proposed regressions, which 
are shown in Table 3. In all the regressions, the variable cash 
holdings (∆C) attracted a positive coefficient; a positive 
value is assigned to the cash retention by the companies, 
that is, the financial market participants, during the period 
selected for the present research, see a positive value in the 
company’s cash. This may reflect the national scenario in 
which companies have few financing options and therefore 
rely even more on internal sources for financing.
However, as explained in the methodology section, 
to test hypothesis H1, we use the terms of interaction in 
the model. We use the terms ∆Ci,t × DivDi,t or ∆Ci,t × 
Dummyi,t to estimate the effect of extra dividend payment 
in the value of cash to the company. Thus, as theorized, it 
is expected that the coefficient of these interactions will 
be negative, that is, indicating that the MVC decreases 
as the company decides to distribute money above the 
mandatory minimum. The logic behind this expectation 
is that if binding dividend constraint really results from 
financial constraints, shareholders will place a higher 
value on cash reserves of firms that pay just the minimum 
mandatory dividend than on cash reserves of firms that 
pay above this amount.
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Table 3











0.68*** 0.75*** 0.62** 0.68***
(2.97) (3.15) (2.43) (2.59)
∆Ei,t
0.16*** 0.15*** 0.13** 0.12**
(3.22) (3.02) (2.29) (2.09)
∆NAi,t
0.03 0.03 0.13** 0.13**
(0.71) (0.72) (2.21) (2.19)
∆RDi,t
-37.45* -36.49* -54.52** -52.60**
(-1.84) (-1.79) (-2.03) (-1.96)
∆Ii,t
-0.01 -0.02 -0.00 -0.02
(-0.08) (-0.21) (-0.02) (-0.19)
∆Di,t
0.85** 0.87*** 1.01** 1.08***
(2.57) (2.64) (2.43) (2.61)
Ci,t-1
0.18*** 0.19*** 0.18*** 0.18***
(4.09) (4.21) (3.49) (3.60)
Li,t
-0.06 -0.06 -0.04 -0.04
(-0.75) (-0.74) (-0.43) (-0.43)
NFi,t
-0.03 -0.03 -0.07** -0.07**
(-1.12) (-1.02) (-2.25) (-2.09)
Ci,t-1*∆Ci,t
-0.16* -0.14 -0.09 -0.06
(-1.82) (-1.64) (-0.87) (-0.60)
Li,t*∆Ci,t
-0.45 -0.49* -0.49 -0.53*








-0.08 -0.08 -0.11 -0.11
(-1.09) (-1.12) (-1.47) (-1.50)
Observations 1,654 1,654 1,371 1,371
R-square 0.377 0.378 0.401 0.402
Company FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Period 2008-2015 2008-2015 2008-2015 2008-2015
Sample All All Reduced Reduced
Note: The variables are described in the text. The Variable column presents all variables included in the model. Regressions 1, 
2, 3, and 4 have as their dependent variable the AV, that is, the excess return of the companies. The data refer to the 2008-2015 
period of Brazilian publicly traded companies from Brasil Bolsa Balcão (B3), with regressions 1 and 2 being the full sample, and 
3 and 4 with a reduced sample, that is, without utility companies. The t statistic is within parentheses, where *** indicate p < 
0.01, ** p < 0.05, and * indicates p < 0.1. 
FE = fixed effect.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
In regression 1 with the complete sample, the 
interaction coefficient (∆Ci,t × DivDi,t) is negative, that 
is, the more companies distribute dividends above 
the minimum required, the lower the MVC for these 
companies. Similarly, in regression 2, with the same 
sample, but using the Dummyi,t, variable the value of this 
interaction is also negative and, in this case, statistically 
significant at the 10% level. From the latter fact, one 
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can infer a segregation in the sample, where companies 
that pay above the mandatory minimum have less value 
attributable to their cash by shareholders than companies 
that do not make this extra distribution. These results 
corroborate the view that companies that have paid 
dividends above the mandatory minimum are not 
financially constrained. They choose to use a portion 
of the free cash flow for distribution of extra earnings, 
indicating to the market that they have resources beyond 
what is necessary to make their projects viable. In addition 
and following Faulkender and Wang (2006), models 3 and 
4 were estimated after excluding public utilities companies 
(besides financial companies) from the sample. In terms 
of sign and statistical significance, the main coefficients 
are similar to those found in the full sample (models 1 
and 2). The difference in excluding utility companies from 
the sample lies only in the magnitude of the coefficients, 
where companies that pay above the minimum have even 
lower value assigned to their cash holdings.
After the estimation of the proposed model, we are able 
to measure the sensitivity of AV (returns in excess to the 
market benchmark) to variations on cash holdings. This 
step has the purpose of directly measure the AV linked to 
the variation in the cash, i.e., how much value is assigned 
by the financial market to an additional cash unit (∆C). 
The calculation is performed through the first derivative 
of AV with respect to ∆C and is demonstrated previously 
in equation 2. Results are summarized in Table 4.
When analyzing the results obtained with the data of 
the model 1 and using the variable DivDi,t, it is observed 
that the MVC of companies that have paid dividends 
above the mandatory minimum is smaller than the MVC 
of companies that have paid just the mandatory minimum. 
In both cases, it is statistically demonstrated that the 
MVC is greater than 0, that is, for the two groups there 
is a positive value associated with and additional unit of 
cash, but this effect is smaller for companies that distribute 
extras dividends. However, as indicated by the results in 
Table 3, this difference between these two groups is not 
statistically significant. 
Similarly, model 2 uses the same sample, but using 
the variable Dummyi,t as representative of the extra 
dividend payment. With the data estimated by this model, 
the results also indicate that the MVC is smaller for 
companies that distribute extra dividends. Moreover, 
we cannot reject that the MVC of these companies is 0, 
that is, for companies that pay above the minimum there 
would be no value in additional cash units, probably 
denoting that they are not financially restricted and 
have cash holdings in excess to what is needed to 
pursue positive net present value (NPV) projects. For 
companies that pay just the mandatory minimum the 
MVC is positive and statistically different from 0 at the 
1% level. These evidences suggest that shareholders place 
a higher value on cash reserves of companies that pay just 
the mandatory minimum vis-a-vis companies that pay 
above the mandatory minimum, and are consistent with 
the view that the former firms are financial constrained 
and likely will use cash to fund future value-enhancing 
investments (Faulkender & Wang, 2006).
Table 4
Post estimation test – Marginal value of cash (MVC)




MV C = α1 + α10Ci,t−1 = 0








MV C = α1 + α10Ci,t−1 = 0








V AM = α1 + α10Ci,t−1 = 0








MV C = α1 + α10Ci,t−1 = 0





Note: The variables are described in the text. The Model column refers to regressions contained in Table 3. The Sample column 
indicates which companies were selected for the test: mandatory minimum (companies that just pay the mandatory minimum) 
and above required (only those companies that have distributed dividends above mandatory minimum). The Hypothesis column 
describes the post estimation test performed. The MVC column shows the result calculated at means of continuous variables 
and at observed values of nominal variables. Finally, the p-value column indicates the statistic of the linear post-test (on the 
hypothesis) performed, where *** indicate p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, and * indicates p < 0.1.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
Models 3 and 4 restrict the sample by excluding 
public utilities, following Faulkender and Wang (2006). 
In both models 3 and 4, the companies that distributed 
extra dividends have lower MVC than those that pay 
just the mandatory minimum. The post estimation tests 
suggest that is not possible to reject that companies that 
pay above the mandatory minimum have an additional 
marginal value equal to 0. For companies that pay only 
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the minimum, the MVC is positive and statistically 
significant at the 10% level (model 3) and 5% level 
(model 4). These results corroborate the previous ones 
and indicate that companies that pay dividends above the 
minimum have a smaller value attached to an extra unit 
of cash when compared to companies that pay just the 
mandatory minimum. One possible implication of this 
result is that companies that pay above the minimum have 
broad access to financing, which would allow for greater 
investments and dividend payments. In contrast, the other 
companies – paying just the mandatory minimum – have 
greater value for their cash, which probably denotes a 
greater dependence on internal sources for investment 
and financing. This extra cash would likely be used to 
finance value-enhancing investments for these firms. 
Our evidences so far suggest that mandatory dividend 
(or any source of withdrawal of resources from within the 
company) tends to have a different impact on Brazilian 
publicly traded companies, according to the their access 
to external capital markets.
Regarding the control variables in our regressions, 
results presented at Table 3 indicated that changes in 
earnings (∆Ei,t), changes in dividends (∆Di,t), and the 
level of cash (Ci,t-1) are positively and statistically related 
to excess stock returns. These results are qualitatively 
identical to those presented by Faulkender and Wang 
(2006). Finally and different from these authors, we found 
that changes in R&D expenses (∆RDi,t) are negatively 
related to excess stock returns.
Prior, other research used the methodology of 
Faulkender and Wang (2006) to investigate the value of 
cash holdings in different markets or periods, relating to 
different variables of interest. For instance, Dittmar and 
Mahrt-Smith (2007) showed that corporate governance 
has a substantial impact on the value of a dollar held 
by North American companies from 1990 to 2003. 
We can also quote Denis and Sibilkov (2009) – North 
American companies from 1985 to 2006 and corporate 
investment; Tong (2011) – North American companies 
from 1998 to 2005 and diversification; Steffen, Zanini, 
Kronbauer, and Ott (2011) – Brazilian companies from 
1990 to 2008; and Louis, Sun, and Urcan (2012) – North 
American companies from 1974 to 2006 and accounting 
conservatism. In common, these papers demonstrated 
cash is more valuable for constrained firms. So, our results 
are in line with those reported by the literature on the 
subject, since we showed that shareholders place a higher 
value on cash reserves of companies that pay just the 
mandatory minimum and are consistent with the view 
that the former firms are financial constrained and likely 
will use cash to fund future value-enhancing investments. 
4.2 The Impact of the Mandatory Dividend on 
Corporate Investment – H2
This hypothesis has the purpose of verifying whether 
the minimum mandatory dividend reduces the investment 
level of financially restricted companies, that is, those 
distributing only the mandatory dividend. The descriptive 
statistics of variables included in the model are summarized 
in Table 5. This table presents summary statistics for two 
different groups – companies that distribute dividends 
above the mandatory minimum (panel A) and those that 
do not (panel B).
Table 5
Descriptive statistics of variables for H2 model
Variable Obs. Mean Median σ Kurtosis Skewness
Panel A: Companies that distribute “above” the mandatory dividend
Invi,t 536 0.102 0.074 0.425 5.607 0.484
CFi,t 536 2.04 0.592 3.603 7.892 2.448
Qi,t−1 536 4.519 1.21 17.812 39.858 6.194
MDivi,t−1 536 0.125 0.124 0.067 2.913 0.425
Panel B: Companies that distribute only the “minimum” dividend
Invi,t 271 0.171 0.121 0.413 5.443 0.449
CFi,t 271 2.577 0.49 4.385 4.972 1.879
Qi,t−1 271 4.859 1.205 17.57 38.907 6.016
MDivi,t−1 271 0.127 0.122 0.075 2.521 0.429
Note: The variables are described in the text. Descriptive statistics have been segmented into groups: in Panel A we present 
descriptive statistics of companies that always pay dividends above the mandatory minimum, and in Panel B those companies 
that pay only the minimum. The Variable column presents all the variables included in the model, except for the interaction 
variables, and n represents the number of companies in each group. The Obs. and Average columns indicate the number of 
observations collected for each of the variables and its mean, respectively. The column Median and σ show the value separating 
the higher half from the lower half of a data sample and the standard deviation for each of the variables, respectively. Finally, 
the Kurtosis and Skewness columns present data about the probability distribution. The data refer to the 2008-2015 period of 
Brazilian publicly traded companies from Brasil Bolsa Balcão (B3), with the exception of financial companies.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
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This comparison is especially interesting, since both 
groups of companies have similar characteristics – dividend 
distributors, i.e., with positive results in their balance 
sheets, but they differ in the proportion of profits passed 
on to their shareholders. We observe that companies with 
distributions of dividends above mandatory minimum 
have a higher cash flow than those that distribute only 
the minimum. In contrast, these have higher levels of the 
investment variable. These results corroborate the idea that 
companies that pay only the minimum do so to be able 
to invest more, while companies that distribute above the 
minimum do so because they have greater internal cash 
flow. Finally, there is no differentiation between groups 
for the MDivt−1 and Tobin’s Qt−1 variables.
Regarding the dependent variable Invi,t, we can observe, 
in Figure 3, its temporal evolution (analogous to the 
analysis made on the dependent variable of the previous 
model). Looking at this figure, we can clearly see that the 
corporate investment of the companies selected in the 
sample has a clear downward pattern over time, that is, 
companies are investing less and less, a possible reflection 
of the crises that occurred in Brazil and the world during 
the sample period. In this case, there are not remarkable 
differences between the groups and the entire sample.
Figure 3 Temporal evolution of the mean value of the variable Invi,t
Note: The chart is divided into three groups: Average Inv reflects the data for all sample companies, Average Inv (MINIMUM), 
those who distributed only the minimum mandatory dividend, and Average Inv (ABOVE) those who distributed above the 
minimum.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
After the sample descriptive statistical analysis, we 
now begin to explore the impact of mandatory dividends 
on the level of investment of financially constrained 
(unconstrained) companies, that is, those that distribute 
only (above) the mandatory dividend. These results are 
summarized in Table 6.
When we analyze the regression of the investment 
model 3 just using cash flow and Tobin’s Q (variables 
widely used in investment models), both variables have 
positive coefficient and are statistically significant at the 
1% level. This result indicates that Brazilian companies 
depend on cash flow (internal sources of financing) to 
carry out new projects. This may be a consequence, among 
others, of the few sources of financing existing in Brazil. 
Additionally, investment opportunities (Tobin’s Qt−1) 
affects positively corporate investment, corroborating 
with our initial expectations.
Profit distribution and regulation: the impact of mandatory dividend in corporate internal funding
538 R. Cont. Fin. – USP, São Paulo, v. 31, n. 84, p. 524-541, Sept./Dec. 2020
The cash flow used to distribute the mandatory 
dividend could also be (instead) used to finance projects 
economically favorable to companies. Therefore, dividends 
can act as limiting agents of investments, thus damaging 
shareholders themselves. Therefore, in our second model, 
we introduce the variable MDivi,t−1 – mandatory dividend. 
This variable negatively affects corporate investment 
accordingly to our econometric model. This fact 
corroborates with the initial expectations of the research, 
although its coefficient is not statistically significant.
Specifically in Brazil, the legislation imposes a 
minimum compulsory distribution of dividends and 
this obligation does not consider the different realities 
faced by companies. Companies that distribute only 
the mandatory dividend send very strong signals to the 
market. These companies, by their own criteria, decide 
to retain as much of their profits as possible in company 
projects, without distributing them to their shareholders. 
Thus, it was expected that, for this group of companies, 
the mandatory dividend have a larger impact on the firm’s 
investment, since these firms demonstrate that they need 
the maximum possible of their internal resources to fund 
these investments.
Table 6 
Coefficients of the regression for H2 model
Variable
1 2 3 4 5
Invi,t Invi,t Invi,t Invi,t Invi,t
CFi,t
0.12*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.12***
(8.92) (8.22) (8.30) (8.40) (7.41)
Qi,t−1
0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***
(4.42) (4.00) (4.10) (3.98) (3.00)
MDivi,t−1
-0.16 -0.19* -0.26** -0.02








0.08*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07***
(10.55) (9.56) (9.51) (9.58) (6.04)
Observations 1,388 1,388 1,388 1,388 1,388
R-squared 0.1347 0.1424 0.1437 0.1455 0.1388
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample 2008-2015 2008-2015 2008-2015 2008-2015 2008-2015
Data Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Panel
Estimation OLS OLS OLS OLS R.E
Note: The variables are described in the text. The Variable column show all variables included in the model. The dependent 
variable is investment (Inv), measured by the annual growth of fixed assets. Industry dummy represents the presence of a 
binary control variable for the corporate economic sector, and the year dummy indicates the presence of the binary variable 
representative of the sample years. The data refer to the 2008-2015 period of Brazilian publicly traded companies from Brasil 
Bolsa Balcão (B3), excluding financial companies. Line Data indicates the type of data used in the model: pooled or panel. The t 
statistic is within parentheses, where *** indicate p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, and * indicates p < 0.1.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
Therefore, in our third and fourth models we introduce 
the variables mini,t−1 and MDivi,t−1 × mini,t−1, respectively. 
When mini,t−1 is included (model 3), MDivi,t−1 attract 
a negative and statistically significant coefficient. This 
result suggest that mandatory dividends reduce firms’ 
investment, irrespective of their financial status. The not 
statistically significant coefficient of mini,t−1 indicates that 
investment of companies that pay just the mandatory 
minimum are not different from the investment of 
companies that pay above this minimum.
Model 4 also includes the interaction MDivi,t−1 × mini,t−1. 
The main objective of this model is to demonstrate the 
differential impact of mandatory dividend (MDivi,t-1) 
on corporate investment between Brazilian companies 
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that pay only the mandatory dividend and those that 
pay above this minimum. From the negative and 
statistically significant coefficient of the variable MDivi,t-1, 
we can deduce that the mandatory dividend reduces 
the investment of Brazilian companies that pay above 
the mandatory minimum. This result contradicts our 
expectations. The positive and statistically significant 
coefficient of the interaction term indicates that the 
mandatory dividend does not have a negative impact 
on the corporate investment for companies that distribute 
only the mandatory dividend, the opposite of what we 
expected initially. These results suggest that mandatory 
dividends affect adversely the investments of firms that 
pay above the mandatory minimum and do not harm 
the investments of firms that pay just the minimum. If 
we believe that a binding dividend constraint signals 
financial constraints, the roles of these two groups of 
companies should be reversed. In sum, these evidences 
strongly reject our hypothesis H2.
Previously, a number of national empirical studies 
have highlighted the impact of cash flow, investment 
opportunities, and financial constraints on corporate 
investment (Aldrighi & Bisinha, 2010; Kirch, Procianoy, 
& Terra, 2014; Machado, 2016). In these studies, as a 
rule, we note that cash flow and investment opportunities 
positively impact corporate investment and that financial 
constraints directly affect the phenomenon studied. 
The results of our research are in line with the findings 
of other Brazilian researches cited above. However, we 
have advanced as we incorporate into the traditional 
model the variables representing mandatory dividend 
payment – a significant source of cash flow generated by 
companies that could directly impact firms’ investment 
policy.
How can we reconcile these conflicting results of 
hypotheses H1 and H2? As we argue in the introductory 
section, we believe that our tests involving the MVC are a 
better way to analyze the effects of mandatory dividends 
on firm financial behavior, since the dependent variable is 
set by market investors and not by the same persons that 
decide about the dividend police. This is not the case when 
we analyze the investment decision: this variable is set by 
the same persons that decide about the dividend police. In 
few words, dividend and investment are jointly determined 
and so dividend is endogenous in the investment equation. 
This endogeneity problem precludes us of estimating the 
real (unbiased) effect of mandatory dividend on corporate 
investment. Taking these considerations into account, 
we are confident that our results regarding H1 reveal the 
real behavior of Brazilian firms and should receive more 
attention than those regarding H2.
Finally, following the suggestions of an anonymous 
referee and as a robustness test, we rerun our original 
regressions using a different approach to separate 
observations in groups. Instead of separating observations 
in two groups – firms-years that pay just the mandatory 
minimum and firms-years that pay above mandatory 
minimum – we separate firms in three groups: firms 
that always (during the entire sample period) pay above 
the mandatory (above group), firms that sometimes 
pay above and at other times pay just the minimum 
(vary group), and firms that always pay the mandatory 
minimum (min group). Our original criteria recognize 
that firms can change their financially constraint status 
over time, while this alternative criteria suggest that the 
long-run payout behavior is what could drive our main 
results. If we can assume that firms in the min group 
are financially constrained, firms in the vary group are 
partially financially constrained, and firms in the above 
group are financially unconstrained, these new results 
(omitted, but available upon request) are in line with those 
we present in the main text. For example, regarding the 
MVC, this value decreases as we move from the min group 
to the vary group and reduces even more when we move 
from the min group to the above group (although this last 
difference is not statistically significant, probably because 
of the low number of observations/firms in this group). In 
our view, these new and novel results are complementary 
and reinforce the conclusions we draw from the initial 
results that we keep in the main text.
5. FINAL COMMENTS
The purpose of our research was to verify the impact 
of mandatory dividends on Brazilian publicly traded 
companies’ internal funding, focusing on both the value of 
cash holdings and the impact on corporate investment. We 
accomplish this by estimating firm value and investment 
regressions for a sample of 1,654 dividend distributions 
from 2008 to 2015.
Our results indicate that mandatory dividend has 
an impact on the companies’ internal funding. They 
show that companies paying just the minimum dividend 
have higher value attached to an extra unit of cash, i.e., 
they have a greater dependence on internal sources 
for investment and financing in these companies, and 
also indicate that mandatory dividend has a negative 
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impact on corporate investment, but only for companies 
paying dividends above the minimum, contrary to our 
expectations.
We argue that the MVC approach is a more effective 
way to test the impact of regulation on corporate 
financial decisions, and this last evidence may be the 
result of endogeneity problems in investment regressions. 
Therefore, we are confident that our results reveal that 
mandatory dividends could be detrimental to some 
firms, precluding them from making ideal investment 
and financing decisions. To the best of our knowledge, we 
are the first to use the MVC approach to study the impact 
of mandatory dividends on firm financial decisions. For 
all these reasons, we believe that our study contributes 
to the literature, adding novel empirical evidences on the 
(probably) non-intended consequences of regulation on 
business matters.
Considering the Brazilian context, where sources 
of financing are expensive and scarce, this evidence 
obtained by the present research has great relevance for 
the financial market. Based on this study, domestic and 
foreign investors will have more accurate information 
on the impact of the mandatory dividend law on the 
companies to be invested. Managers, especially from 
foreign companies who would like to establish a base in 
Brazil, will also have more inputs on withdrawing part 
of their companies’ cash flow. Even governments that 
adopt or intend to adopt a mandatory dividend can use 
these findings to make the most appropriate decision 
for their countries. Not least, the present research serves 
as another step in the academy’s understanding of this 
legal mechanism, an important law that has generated 
few academic studies – perhaps for its complexity and 
lack of data. 
It is important to emphasize that the law aims to 
protect the minority investor against the expropriation 
of resources within the firms by insiders. However, in 
dealing with all cases equally, legislation ends up harming 
companies that rely on these resources for their financing, 
thereby damaging their shareholders.
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